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ARTICLE 
THE PERNICIOUS EFFECT OF DUBIOUS MATERIALITY 
Timothy M. Todd † 
“As now construed, § 1014 covers false explanations for arriving 
late at a meeting, false assurances that an applicant does not mind 
if the loan officer lights up a cigar, false expressions of enthusiasm 
about the results of a football game or an election, as well as false 
compliments about the subject of a family photograph.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
According to many scholars and commentators, we live in an overly 
criminalized era.2 Over-criminalization can take two main forms:3 first, 
actual over-authorization of criminal sanctions by legislatures,4 and second, 
over-application by prosecutors (or courts).5 This short symposium Article 
adds to the over-criminalization zeitgeist by arguing that the absence of 
express materiality qualifiers in statutes necessarily adds troubling 
overbreadth to statutes. Moreover, even when materiality is an element of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 † Timothy M. Todd is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of 
Law at Liberty University School of Law. 
 1. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 502 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 2. See, e.g., Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea 
Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence, 101 KY. L.J. 723 (2013); Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime 
to Tear Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. 
L. REV. 1191 (2015); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 
719-39 (2005); Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a Growing Problem, 
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529 (2012); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 79-80 (1933); George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and other 
High Crimes: Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1417 (2007); Dick Thornburgh, The Challenge of Over-Criminalization, 33-DEC PA. LAW. 
36 (2011); Ekow N. Yankah, A Paradox in Overcriminalization, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2011); 
see generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL Law 
(2008).  
 3. Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the 
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1545–46 (1997). 
 4. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 735 (2013) (“The principal form that overcriminalization takes is the 
passage of unnecessary criminal statutes.”).  
 5. Green, supra note 3, at 1545–46. 
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offense, its judicial construction can effectively nullify any purported 
protection. The net effect of both phenomena is a pernicious creep of over-
criminalization that undercuts a free society. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Framers were acutely concerned with the extent and power of 
criminal laws.6 For instance, Alexander Hamilton wrote as follows in 
Federalist No. 83:  
I must acknowledge, that I cannot readily discern the inseparable 
connection between the existence of liberty, and the trial by jury, 
in civil cases. Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of 
prosecuting pretended offences, and arbitrary punishments upon 
arbitrary convictions, have ever appeared to me the great engines 
of judicial despotism; and all these have relation to criminal 
proceedings.7 
This concern is best embodied by the various protections provided in the 
federal Constitution to prevent such abuses by placing express limits on the 
government’s ability to create and execute criminal penalties. Additional 
express examples of protecting the citizenry from the state’s criminal law 
power are burdens of proof and persuasion; presumption of innocence; the 
Fifth Amendment and the privilege against self-incrimination; double 
jeopardy protections; and prohibitions on ex post facto laws and bills of 
attainder.8 
Historical concerns about the rise of the criminal state are borne out by 
recent statistics. In 2005, about 2.2 million persons were incarcerated in 
federal or state prison, which is a rate of 737 inmates per 100,000 residents.9 
In other words, 1 in every 138 residents was incarcerated.10 In 2015, the 
                                                                                                                                      
 6. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 4, at 725–26 (“The Framers were concerned that a 
voluminous criminal code was a threat to liberty, so federal criminal law started out small, 
protecting only what was necessary to get the new, limited national government up and 
running.”). In fact, “[t]he first federal criminal statute outlawed no more than approximately 
thirty crimes, and each one was closely tied to the needs of the new enterprise.” Id. at 726. 
 7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 8. Ronald A. Cass, Overcriminalization: Administrative Regulation, Prosecutorial 
Discretion, and the Rule of Law, 15 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 14 (2014).  
 9. DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 4 (2008). 
 10. Id. 
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actively incarcerated population was 2,173,800,11 with an incarceration rate 
of 670 per 100,000 residents.12 Indeed, the prison population rates have nearly 
quadrupled since the 1980s.13  
Looking internationally, as a point of comparison, “the United States has 
by far the highest rate in the world—nearly five times higher than that of any 
other Western industrialized country.”14  Even more troubling (and sad) is 
that “[a]n estimated 1 in 20 children born in the United States is destined to 
serve time in a state or federal prison at some point in his life.”15 Moreover, 
“[m]inorities are disproportionately represented behind bars: 12.6% of all 
black men ages 25 to 29 are in jails or prisons, compared with 1.7% of 
similarly-aged whites.”16 Perhaps surprisingly, only 7.9% of federal prisoners 
in 2009 were convicted of violent crimes.17 
Although incarceration rates are a commonly used metric, a more robust 
measure of over-criminalization is the number of people under the 
supervision of the criminal justice system, such as those on probation or 
parole.18 Data from the early 2000s indicate that 4.2 million persons in the 
United States are on probation and approximately 784,000 are on parole;19 
the latter are, of course, subject to incarceration if they violate the terms of 
their release. More recent data indicate that, as of 2015, there are 875,000 on 
parole and nearly 3.8 million on probation.20 Between the actively 
incarcerated population and those on probation or parole, there are 
6,741,400 persons under the control of the criminal justice system.21 
The effects of over-criminalization do not end with release at the prison 
gates; they extend into reentry and often follow offenders for the rest of their 
lives. As Professor Michelle Alexander has noted, “[e]ven when released from 
the system’s formal control, the stigma of criminality lingers,”22 and other 
                                                                                                                                      
 11. Daniel Kaeble & Lauren Glaze, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2015, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf. 
 12. Id. 
 13. HUSAK, supra note 9, at 5. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 4. 
 16. Id.  
 17. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 101 (2012). 
 18. HUSAK, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Kaeble & Glaze, supra note 11. 
 21. Id. 
 22. ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 141. 
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commentators have referred to a prison sentence as “the mark of Cain.”23 
Indeed, as Professor Alexander avers, a criminal record basically allows 
“discrimination in employment, housing, education, public benefits, and jury 
service.”24 A troubling aspect of the many collateral consequences is that they 
make it difficult for offenders to fully reintegrate into society.25 Consequently, 
“these sanctions can be the most damaging and painful aspect of a criminal 
conviction.”26  
Quantifying the actual level of over-criminalization is a devilishly 
nettlesome endeavor.27 The number of criminal statutes and laws are used as 
a proxy for it, though even this is not an ideal metric.28 The United States 
Code is approximately 27,000 pages of printed text.29 In those 27,000 pages, 
there are approximately 3,300 provisions with criminal sanctions, many of 
which are codified in Title 18.30 Other estimates peg the number at 4,000.31  
When factoring in federal regulations, the provisions with sanctions 
balloon—to 300,000 regulations with sanctions, by some estimates.32 In fact, 
“[a] blue ribbon ABA task force found that more than forty percent of federal 
criminal provisions passed after the Civil War had been enacted in the 
twenty-eight year period between 1970 and 1998.”33 A Federalist Society 
study found that “there had been a thirty percent increase in federal offenses 
                                                                                                                                      
 23. Id. at 142. 
 24. Id. at 141. 
 25. Id. at 143. 
 26. Id.; see also Internal Exile: Collateral Consequences of Conviction in Federal Laws and 
Regulations, A.B.A. (Jan. 2009), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/cecs/internalexile.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 27. HUSAK, supra note 9, at 9. 
 28. See id. at 7–9. 
 29. Id. at 9. 
 30. Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, while the mere numerosity is compelling, this does not 
even broach the issues that are implicated by the federalization of local crime. See, e.g., John S. 
Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673 
(1999); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 643 (1997). Chief Justice Rehnquist presciently warned against this trend: “The trend to 
federalize crimes that traditionally have been handled in state courts . . . threatens to change 
entirely the nature of our federal system . . . . Federal courts were not created to adjudicate 
local crimes, no matter how sensational or heinous the crimes may be.” Chief Justice William 
H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 134, 135 
(1999); see also Larkin, supra note 4. 
 31. Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress 
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 753 (2005). 
 32. See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 10. 
 33. Beale, supra note 31, at 753. 
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carrying criminal penalties between 1980 and 2004.”34 It is shocking—and 
sad—that it has been said that “not even the Justice Department, knows the 
actual number of federal criminal offenses.”35 
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that over-criminalization cannot 
just be limited to a review of statutes and convictions; we must be mindful of 
all those interactions with the justice system that do not result in a conviction 
or even a prosecution. For instance, in 2004 there were approximately 14 
million arrests made.36 Of course, not all of those arrests ended in prosecution 
and conviction, but the people who were arrested still suffered 
consequences—both at the time of the arrest and going forward.37  
Over-criminalization research has often focused on over-authorization of 
criminal sanctions by legislatures. This stream of over-criminalization makes 
relatively innocuous conduct (or at least conduct without actual substantive 
harm) criminal. There are myriad examples of such over-criminalization in 
various penal codes. Professor Eric Luna provides some salient examples: 
Delaware punishes by up to six months imprisonment the sale of 
perfume or lotion as a beverage. In Alabama, it is a felony to maim 
one’s self to “excite sympathy” or to train a bear to wrestle, while 
Nevada criminalizes the disturbance of a congregation at worship 
                                                                                                                                      
 34. Id. at 754. 
 35. Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 739 (2012); see also Larkin, supra note 4. 
 36. See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 13 (citation omitted). 
 37. For instance, in future questionnaires or applications that ask if the respondent has 
ever been arrested. This can affect many aspects of life such as employment and even 
international travel (e.g., in visa applications). Edwin Meese and Paul Larkin described the 
consequences of exposing a morally blameless person to the criminal justice system:  
Dragging a morally blameless person into the criminal justice system forces 
him—as well as his family, friends, colleagues, and anyone else who cares for 
him—to endure the series of harms and indignities that a modern law 
enforcement bureaucracy inflicts on every suspect, the guilty and innocent alike: 
being arrested, undergoing a thorough probing of one’s person and whatever is 
worn or carried incident to a search following arrest; being handcuffed, driven 
to the police station in the back seat of a patrol car, booked, waiting for hours in 
a temporary holding cell, and doing the ‘perp walk’ before the media; waiting in 
jail until bail is posted (a cost that will never be recouped); paying for a lawyer 
with one’s life savings or child’s college fund; and spending a terribly long and 
painful period awaiting trial while the police and media investigate, and 
sometime publicize, every embarrassing aspect of one’s life. 
Meese & Larkin, supra note 35, at 753–54. Moreover, these consequences are even more 
exacerbated now with the advent of Internet searches and archives, which puts this 
information indefinitely in easy grasp of everyone forever.  
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by “engaging in any boisterous or noisy amusement.” Tennessee 
makes it a misdemeanor to hunt wildlife from an aircraft, Indiana 
bans the coloring of birds and rabbits, Massachusetts punishes 
those who frighten pigeons from their nests, and Texas declares it 
a felony to use live animals as lures in dog racing. In turn, spitting 
in public spaces is a misdemeanor in Virginia, and anonymously 
sending an indecent or “suggestive” message in South Carolina is 
punishable by up to three years imprisonment.38 
Even more salient examples include the unauthorized use of “Smokey Bear” 
images39 and unauthorized use of the 4-H Club insignia.40  
Professor Douglas Husak, in his book on over-criminalization, posits 
three categories of penal code innovations that spurred the growth of 
criminal laws: (1) overlapping crimes, which describe re-criminalizing the 
same conduct;41 (2) risk-prevention crimes, which describe offenses that do 
not necessarily require harm, but only the possibility of harm;42 and (3) 
ancillary crimes, which describe instances in which other statutes are charged 
or prosecuted when the underlying core offense cannot be established.43 
Another interesting thread in the over-criminalization literature is the 
problematic integration of criminal sanctions in complicated regulatory 
regimes.44 As commentators have noted, “[t]hat practice can pose 
extraordinary compliance problems for the average person because criminal 
and regulatory laws exist for very different purposes.”45 In sum, “[t]reating 
regulatory crimes as if they were no different than ‘street’ crimes ignores the 
profound difference between the two classes of offenses and puts parties 
                                                                                                                                      
 38. Eric Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 703, 704 (2005) 
(citation omitted).  
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 711 (2012); see also Beale, supra note 31, at 761. 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 707 (2012); see also Beale, supra note 31, at 761. 
 41. One provided example is criminalizing the destruction of library books, when 
property destruction in general is already proscribed. See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 37. As Husak 
argues, “the main effect of these overlapping statutes is to allow charge stacking that threatens 
defendants with increasingly severe punishments.” Id. at 38. 
 42. Examples are driving with a cell phone or juvenile curfew laws. Id. at 38. 
 43. An example is failure to file a Bank Secrecy Act report when required. Id. at 41. 
 44. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: The 
Proper and Improper Uses of Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 746 (2014). 
 45. Id. 
2018] THE PERNICIOUS EFFECT 321 
 
engaged in entirely legitimate activities without any intent to break the law at 
risk of criminal punishment.”46  
As this Article argues, though, there are additional, more subtle and 
pernicious forms of over-criminalization. First, the absence of express 
materiality qualifiers in statutes necessarily adds troubling overbreadth to 
statutes. Second, even when materiality is an element, its judicial 
construction can nullify any purported protection. 
III.  ABSENCE OF EXPRESS MATERIALITY ELEMENTS IN CRIMINAL STATUTES 
In United States v. Wells,47 the Supreme Court was presented with the issue 
of whether materiality is an element of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which basically 
makes it a crime to knowingly make a misstatement to a federally insured 
bank.48 In a nutshell, the government charged the defendants under § 1014 
for concealing the true terms of lease contracts, which placed on their 
corporation (and not its customers) the obligation to service equipment.49 
According to the government, the service obligations were hidden to avoid 
freeing up cash flow that the bank might have otherwise required to be in 
reserve had it known the true extent of the service obligations.50 Additionally, 
the defendants were charged under § 1014 for “forging” their wives’ 
signatures on personal guarantees to the bank.51  
In analyzing whether materiality was a required element under § 1014, the 
Court defined the term “materiality” in this context as “‘ha[ving] a natural 
tendency to influence, or [being] capable of influencing, the decision of the 
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.’”52 The Court used a three-
part framework in its analysis: (1) examine the text of the statute; (2) examine 
the common-law meaning of the terms used; and (3) examine statutory 
(legislative) history.53  
                                                                                                                                      
 46. Id. As Larkin later notes, “If you lie, cheat, steal, or physically harm someone, you 
have broken the law. Said differently, if you know the Decalogue, you know what not to do. 
By contrast, regulatory statutes are long, elaborate, intricate, and reticulated.” Id. at 754. 
 47. 519 U.S. 482 (1997). 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2012).  
 49. Wells, 519 U.S. at 484–85. 
 50. Id. at 485. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Wells, 519 U.S. at 489 (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 53. Id.; see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999); Megan L. Hoffman, Comment, 
The Substantial Weight Test: A Proposal to Resolve The Circuits’ Disparate Interpretations Of 
Materiality Under The False Claims Act, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 181 (2009). 
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The Court, of course, noted that “[n]owhere does [§ 1014] further say that 
a material fact must be the subject of the false statement or so much as 
mention materiality.”54 Rather, the Court emphasized that “its terms cover 
‘any’ false statement that meets the other requirements in the statute, and the 
term ‘false statement’ carries no general suggestion of influential 
significance.”55 Next, the Court concluded that, at common law, the term 
“false statement” did not have an acquired meaning requiring materiality.56 
Finally, the Court observed that when § 1014 was originally enacted, 
Congress explicitly included materiality requirements in other sections 
regarding false representations.57 Therefore, the Court reasoned, “[t]he most 
likely inference in these circumstances is that Congress deliberately dropped 
the term ‘materiality’ without intending materiality to be an element of § 
1014.”58 
The Court did at least pay lip service to the concern that by not reading 
materiality into § 1014, it may “impose substantial criminal penalties on 
relatively trivial or innocent conduct.”59 In effect, the Court explained that 
the mens rea element in § 1014—requiring that “the speaker knows the falsity 
of what he says and intends it to influence the institution”60—effectively 
mitigates the over-criminalization concern.61 As explained in Part IV, this is 
myopic and offers, at best, only a veneer of protection in some cases.   
A. The Problem of Eroding Materiality 
The rationale in Wells and cases of its ilk, which eliminate or erode 
materiality and other statutory safeguards, is hugely problematic because 
these cases needlessly expose citizens to the specter of criminal prosecution. 
As Justice Stevens explained in his Wells dissent,  
                                                                                                                                      
 54. Wells, 519 U.S. at 490. 
 55. Id. at 490 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 781 (1988); Kay v. United 
States, 303 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1938)). 
 56. Wells, 519 U.S. at 490. 
 57. Id. at 492. 
 58. Id. at 493 (citing United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1994)). 
 59. Id. at 498 (citing United States v. Williams, 12 F.3d 452, 458 (5th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Staniforth, 971 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 60. Wells, 519 U.S. at 499. 
 61. Ironically, the Court noted that it already had to cabin the scope of § 1014 as applied 
to bad checks in order to prevent § 1014 from making a “broad range of unremarkable conduct 
a violation of federal law.” Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1982). Basically, 
the Court believes its ad hoc and post hoc declarations of overbreadth are sufficient to protect 
the facially broad sweep of § 1014.  
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As now construed, § 1014 covers false explanations for arriving 
late at a meeting, false assurances that an applicant does not mind 
if the loan officer lights up a cigar, false expressions of enthusiasm 
about the results of a football game or an election, as well as false 
compliments about the subject of a family photograph. So long as 
the false statement is made “for the purpose of influencing” a bank 
officer, it violates § 1014.62 
Justice Stevens persuasively advanced three reasons why federal false 
statement statutes should have materiality qualifiers. First, he argued that, in 
common law, neither false statements nor misrepresentations encompassed 
“immaterial falsehoods, such as mere flattery.”63 Second, and perhaps most 
compelling, is his point that many federal false statement statutes lack an 
express materiality requirement:64 “[A]t least 100 federal false statement 
statutes may be found in the United States Code. About 42 of them contain 
an express materiality requirement; approximately 54 do not.”65  Indeed, he 
noted that “[t]he kinds of false statements found in the first category are, to 
my eyes at least, indistinguishable from those in the second category. Nor is 
there any obvious distinction between the range of punishments authorized 
by the two different groups of statutes.”66 Third, and finally, he emphasized 
that, in the jurisprudential ebb of the 1940s—when § 1014 was enacted—
Congress relied more on the Court to fill gaps in the law based on the 
common-law tradition.67  
In sum, the concern is that criminal statutes without robust materiality 
and specificity invite “abuse on the part of prosecuting officials, who are left 
free to harass any individuals or groups who may be the object of official 
displeasure.”68 
B. The Problems with Defining Materiality 
Having materiality expressly required as an element in a statute is, 
everything else being equal, better than not having it at all. There are still 
                                                                                                                                      
 62. Wells, 519 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 504. 
 64. Id. at 505. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 505–06. 
 67. Wells, 519 U.S. at 509–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As he quipped, “[i]t was only three 
years earlier that one of the greatest judges of the era—indeed, of any era—had admonished 
us ‘not to make a fortress out of the dictionary.’” Id. at 510 (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 
F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945)). 
 68. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 775 (1974). 
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issues, however, with using materiality in statutes, mainly related to the 
concept of legal (un)certainty.69 Materiality can be a subjective and nebulous 
standard; it is challenging to demarcate its contours. Consequently, citizens 
who rely on materiality to inform and guide their conduct will likely find it a 
poor guide. Additionally, even express materiality may be in a weak form, 
offering only a veneer of protection, and the threshold to trigger materiality 
is so low that overbroad application is still an issue. These shortcomings are 
antithetical to a legal system rooted in individual freedom and liberty.70  
C. Fuzzy Materiality and Predictability  
As Holmes remarked, “the tendency of the law must always be to narrow 
the field of uncertainty.”71 Indeed, legal uncertainty is undesirable and 
suboptimal.72 Uncertainty is the enemy of predictability, and predictability—
which is a function of “[c]onsistency and stability”73—is the hallmark of a just 
legal system.74 Only with consistency and stability “can the law be predictable 
to those who must shape their conduct by it and to lower courts which must 
apply it.”75 
However, a wooden cry of “materiality” does not advance the dual 
interests of consistency and stability because the standard is so nebulous. Like 
Nero’s strategy of posting edicts too high for his citizens, our current system 
makes it easy for people to run afoul of the law,76 oftentimes with the benefit 
                                                                                                                                      
 69. See generally H.W.R. Wade, The Concept of Legal Certainty: A Preliminary Skirmish, 
4 MOD. L. REV. 183 (1941). 
 70. Id. at 189 (“As law exists for security, confidence and freedom, it must be invested 
with as much certainty and uniformity as can be provided by the wavering structures of human 
institutions.”). 
 71. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881). 
 72. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1179 (1989) (“Even in simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the 
Rule of Law.”). 
 73. Williams v. State of N.C., 317 U.S. 287, 323 (1942) (“This Court may follow 
precedents, irrespective of their merits, as a matter of obedience to the rule of stare decisis. 
Consistency and stability may be so served. They are ends desirable in themselves, for only 
thereby can the law be predictable to those who must shape their conduct by it and to lower 
courts which must apply it.”). 
 74. Scalia, supra note 72, at 1179 (“Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the 
law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”). 
 75. Williams, 317 U.S. at 323. 
 76. “It is said that one of emperor Nero’s nasty practices was to post his edicts high on the 
columns so that they would be harder to read and easier to transgress.” Scalia, supra note 72, 
at 1179. 
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of hindsight to boot.77 In sum, if materiality qualifiers still do not “effectively 
guide action,” then there is still undesirable uncertainty in the system. 
A classic example of nebulous or “fuzzy” materiality is in the context of 
securities regulation. The Securities Act of 193378 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934,79 of course, make it illegal to, among other things, make a 
material misstatement of fact in connection with an array of securities-based 
transactions.80 
The Supreme Court, in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.,81 defined 
materiality in the context of SEC Rule 14a-982 as  
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that 
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding 
how to vote . . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered 
the “total mix” of information made available.83 
What exactly, then, constitutes an item of information that would 
significantly alter the “total mix” of information made available? 
Commentators and practitioners have critiqued this standard for its 
opaqueness;84 some have referred to materiality as an “ulcerating experience” 
and as a “gotcha” standard.85 Indeed, even courts have observed that 
materiality has become one of the most unpredictable and elusive 
concepts of the federal securities laws. The SEC itself has despaired 
of providing written guidelines to advise wary corporate 
                                                                                                                                      
 77. That is, in retrospect, something may appear “material” given the development of 
other facts—and, of course, with the ever-granting clarity of hindsight bias, though, at the 
time, such clarity was murky at best.  
 78. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–
77aa (2012)).  
 79. Pub. L. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.). 
 80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 81. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 82. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975). This rule provides that a proxy solicitation cannot be 
“false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.” Id. 
 83. TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449.  
 84. See, e.g., Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept Of “Materiality” Under U.S. 
Federal Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 663–64 (2004); Richard C. Sauer, The 
Erosion of Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 
317, 319 (2007). 
 85. Lee, supra note 84, at 664. 
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management of the distinctions between material and non-
material information, and instead has chosen to rely on an after-
the-fact, case-by-case approach, seeking injunctive relief when it 
believes that the appropriate boundaries have been breached.86 
Despite its decisional opaqueness and uncertainty, “[t]he ‘materiality’ 
threshold therefore ‘plays a critical gatekeeper[s’] role’ by separating the 
essential information from the ‘less important information that would be 
extraneous or irrelevant to investors.’”87 Nevertheless, “[m]ateriality 
determinations in individual cases tend to be so fact-specific that the 
accumulated body of published case law provides limited guidance for 
decision-making.”88 
As demonstrated, just adding a “materiality” qualifier does not necessarily 
provide sterling clarity and may just raise a different set of questions. Any 
ambiguity still subjects decision-makers to compliance costs, risk, and the 
possibility of needless scrutiny. As the Court noted in Cardiff, “[w]ords which 
are vague and fluid . . . may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the 
ancient laws of Caligula.”89 
In sum, even express materiality requirements, if not sufficiently defined, 
do not serve the purpose of informing citizens what exact conduct is 
prohibited. It is axiomatic that vague statutes “violate[] the first essential of 
due process of law.”90 Justice Sutherland noted,  
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be 
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what 
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a 
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary 
notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which 
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that 
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning 
and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due 
process of law.91 
                                                                                                                                      
 86. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Address by Ray 
Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the SEC, “An Inside Look at Rule 10b-5,” ALI-ABA Conference, 
April 10, 1975)). 
 87. Lee, supra note 84, at 662 (internal citations omitted). 
 88. Sauer, supra note 84, at 319. 
 89. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952). 
 90. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
 91. Id. at 391 (citations omitted). 
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Ambiguous materiality, therefore, can lead to inefficiencies, and certainly 
fails to educate the populace about their respective obligations.92 A more 
detailed and bright-line standard, on the other hand, is more efficient. As 
Ehrlich and Posner noted, “[a] perfectly detailed and comprehensive set of 
rules brings society nearer to its desired allocation of resources by 
discouraging socially undesirable activities and encouraging socially 
desirable ones.”93 Moreover, they note, 
The more (efficiently) precise and detailed the applicable 
substantive standard or rule is, the higher is the probability that 
the activity will be deemed illegal if it is in fact undesirable (the 
kind of activity the legislature wanted to prevent) and the lower is 
the probability that the activity will be deemed illegal if it is in fact 
desirable.94 
Continuing the analysis, individuals can only avoid criminal penalty by 
avoiding the criminal activity.95 With a vague or unclear statute (or relevant 
standard—such as ambiguous materiality), they must not only avoid the core 
obviously criminal conduct, but also all other behavior that might possibly 
fall under “the penumbra of the vague standard”—even if that conduct is 
useful or beneficial.96 Indeed, then, “the social costs of vague criminal 
standards might be high.”97 
D. Weak-Form Materiality 
In addition to the subjective, nebulous, and fuzzy aspects of a generic 
materiality requirement, another issue is whether the materiality threshold 
has been lowered so much that it does not provide the intended prophylactic 
(or therapeutic) benefit. Stated otherwise, if it is overly inclusive and includes 
too many items within its ambit, then it offers no real protection at all—that 
is when materiality covers even the trivial.  
                                                                                                                                      
 92. “Contemporary statutes and regulations are often written in terms making it difficult 
for an experienced lawyer to understand their meaning, let alone someone untutored and 
inexperienced in the law.” Larkin, supra note 44, at 757. 
 93. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUDIES 257, 262 (1974).  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 263. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. To be sure, the more detailed a rule is, though, it will need to be changed more 
often. Id. at 278. The level of detail, then, is also a source of the rule’s costs. Id.  
328 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:315 
 
E. Example of Weak-Form Materiality 
One potential example of weak-form materiality is 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), 
which makes it a felony for any person who “[w]illfully makes and subscribes 
any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a 
written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which 
he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.”98 Here 
materiality is expressly in the statute, yet the case law interpreting § 7206 has 
made its materiality element a nullity. Further, the government often 
“charges a taxpayer who files a false return under both the perjury and 
evasion penalty provisions because, unlike the evasion charge, the perjury 
charge doesn’t require proof that tax is due and owing.”99 
A material matter, in this context, is defined as “one that is likely to affect 
the calculation of tax due and payable.”100 This standard, on its face, is of no 
help: Even a dollar misstatement as to income or expense items can affect the 
calculation of tax due and payable. It is possible—indeed likely—that a 
misstatement can be insubstantial (in dollar terms) but be material under § 
7206.  
There are two competing views to interpreting the § 7206 materiality 
standard: (1) the Warden test, which holds that anything that affects the tax 
calculation is material,101 and (2) the DiVarco test, which holds that an item 
is material if it “would have a tendency to influence the IRS in its normal 
processing of tax returns.”102 Under at least the Warden test, then, it seems 
that even a one-dollar misstatement would be material under § 7206.  
Some taxpayers have advanced insubstantiality arguments.103 However, 
those arguments generally have not been successful.104 For instance, the 
Second Circuit noted, in the context of § 7206(1), that “[f]alse statements 
about income do not have to involve substantial amounts in order to violate 
                                                                                                                                      
 98. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 99. FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR (RIA) ¶ V-3101. 
 100. United States v. Griffin, 524 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Boulerice, 325 
F.3d 75, 82 n.3 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. DiRico, 78 F.3d 732, 735–36 (1st Cir. 
1996)).  
 101. United States v. Warden, 545 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2008); see, e.g., MICHAEL SALTZMAN 
& LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRAC. & PROC. ¶ 12.02; DOJ Criminal Tax Manual 12.10[4] (2012 ed.). 
 102. United States v. DiVarco, 343 F. Supp. 101, 103 (N.D. Ill. 1972); SALTZMAN & BOOK, 
supra note 101, at 12.02. This definition is also consistent with United States v. Gaudin, 515 
U.S. 506, 509 (1995).  
 103. See, e.g., DOJ Criminal Tax Manual, 12.10[5], at 18. 
 104. See, e.g., id. at 18–19. 
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this statute.”105 The Seventh Circuit, as well, noted that “[t]his Court has 
previously held that false statements relating to gross income, irrespective of 
the amount, constitute a material misstatement in violation of Section 
7206(1).”106 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s statement to the 
jury that “the issue in a section 7206(1) prosecution is whether the 
misstatements were material, not whether they were substantial.”107 The 
court further emphasized that “the substantiality of the misstatements was 
not relevant to the prosecution under section 7206.”108  
Courts that have elucidated the rationale for § 7206 noted that the issue is 
not simply the collection of tax revenue. As the Second Circuit explained, 
The purpose of § 7206(1) is not simply to ensure that the taxpayer 
pay the proper amount of taxes—though that is surely one of its 
goals. Rather, that section is intended to ensure also that the 
taxpayer not make misstatements that could hinder the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) in carrying out such functions as the 
verification of the accuracy of that return or a related tax return.109 
Consequently, under this rationale, the insubstantiality of the misstatement’s 
effect on actual tax collection is irrelevant. Another outgrowth, perhaps 
surprisingly, of that rationale is that an actual tax deficiency may not even be 
needed for a § 7206 prosecution.110 
IV.  THE RETORTS OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND  
MENS REA PROTECTIONS 
There are at least two (and probably more) legitimate responses to the 
critiques advanced by this Article. First, prosecutorial discretion (and the 
goal of efficiency) makes it likely that trivial offenses will not be prosecuted. 
Second, applicable mens rea requirements also insulate citizens from being 
prosecuted for “innocent” conduct. However, both of these grounds may not 
be as strong as they seem.  
                                                                                                                                      
 105. United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 92 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 106. United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1196 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 107. United States v. Gaines, 690 F.2d 849, 857 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 108. Id. at 858. 
 109. United States v. Greenberg, 735 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984).  
 110. See, e.g., Schepps v. United States, 395 F.2d 749, 749 (5th Cir. 1968) (“[A]ppellant says 
that he should have been allowed to introduce proof showing that the falsity resulted in no tax 
deficiency. This proof was not relevant to the issue raised by the indictment and it was not 
error to reject it . . . .”). 
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Enforcement is costly.111 Normatively, then—at least from a law-and-
economics perspective—“[t]he goal of enforcement, let us assume, is to 
achieve that degree of compliance with the rule of prescribed (or proscribed) 
behavior that the society believes it can afford.”112 As Professor LaFave has 
written, “[o]ne of the most striking features of the American system of 
criminal justice is the broad range of largely uncontrolled discretion 
exercised by the prosecutor.”113 We hope, therefore, that prosecutors, with 
their great and often unchecked discretion, dedicate their limited resources 
to the prosecution of “real” crimes,114 which provides the greatest benefit to 
the community.115  
Indeed, in the age of the plea bargain, the prosecutor is the “preeminent 
actor in the system.”116 Justice Robert Jackson commented that the federal 
prosecutor has “more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other 
person in America.”117 Judge Easterbrook has described the prosecutor’s 
discretion well:  
Prosecutors have absolute discretion. They may prosecute whom 
they please, for such crimes as they please. They may decline to 
prosecute particular crimes or whole categories of offenses, such 
as drug offenses or resale price maintenance . . . . They are 
responsible only to their superiors and the public. No public 
official has more discretion; few participants in private markets 
have more.118 
                                                                                                                                      
 111. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 
532, 532 (1970) (footnotes omitted).  
 114. Indeed, to make the prosecutor prosecute all crimes is simply unworkable—it would 
be “like directing a general to attack the enemy on all fronts at once.” LaFave, supra note 113, 
at 534 (citing T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 153 (1962)). 
 115. LaFave, supra note 113, at 534. 
 116. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
717, 718 (1996). Interestingly, the history of the American prosecutor is an amalgamation of 
historical influences. For example, like the English Attorney General, the prosecutor can end 
prosecutions; like the French “procureur publique,” the prosecutor starts prosecutions; and 
finally, like the Dutch “schout,” the prosecutor is normally a local official over a particular 
region. See id. at 728. 
 117. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 18 (1940); 
see Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current 
White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 165 (2004).  
 118. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market, 12 J. LEGAL STUDIES 289, 299 
(1983). 
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Prosecutorial discretion—or the hope that prosecutors will only go after 
“real” crimes—in many instances is not adequate protection. As applied to 
vague laws, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[a] vague law 
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries 
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis . . . .”119 
Another aspect of prosecutorial discretion is that it is potentially subject 
to abuses. For example, Professor Alexander, in her compelling book, The 
New Jim Crow,120 reviewed the literature and noted, “[t]hese studies have 
shown that youth of color are more likely to be arrested, detained, formally 
charged, transferred to adult court, and confined to secure residential 
facilities than their white counterparts.”121 She also noted, in the context of 
drug offenses, that “[r]acial bias is most acute at the point of entry into the 
system for two reasons: discretion and authorization.”122 
Moreover, as other commentators have argued in other contexts, “the 
existence of rarely-used statutes invites (if not demands) selective 
enforcement and unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants.”123 
Indeed, when this is the case, prosecutors may “single out and punish one 
defendant, or perhaps a handful of defendants, for conduct that is 
widespread.”124 Ambiguous or vague statutes, moreover, “offend due process 
by failing to provide explicit standards for those who enforce them thus 
allowing discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement.”125 
Highly selective enforcement can also be problematic. For example, Dean 
Ronald Cass provides the following example:  
Further, highly selective enforcement, if it is to affect underlying 
behavior, cannot reveal the bases on which enforcement targets 
will be selected—imagine the IRS announcing which deductions 
of what magnitude will cause the agency to audit tax filers. The 
result is that the basis for selecting a small number of potential 
targets for prosecution is not visible to, or predictable by, the 
public. That sort of discretion, which is largely insulated from 
                                                                                                                                      
 119. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).  
 120. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 118 (2012). 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 123. 
 123. Beale, supra note 31, at 757. 
 124. Id. 
 125. “[V]ague statutes offend due process by failing to provide explicit standards for those 
who enforce them thus allowing discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement.” Parker v. Levy, 
417 U.S. 733, 775 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
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significant sources of constraint in individual cases, is antithetical 
to the rule of law.126 
Unfortunately, selective enforcement challenges are often unsuccessful.127 
Other realities of the system need to be considered as well—factors that 
further weaken the perceived protection of prosecutorial discretion. The 
ability to stack (or multiply) charges, which compounds the potential 
sentence, “allows prosecutors to pressure defendants to settle rather than to 
fight, to enter a plea bargain that admits guilt (whether it truly existed or 
addressed conduct that was truly wrongful in any meaningful sense), and to 
take a small punishment.”128 Charging decisions, moreover, are largely 
unreviewable, except in limited circumstances, such as race discrimination.129 
In addition, the risk is present even when the defendant might not have 
done anything wrong. Cass writes, 
[I]f the risk is large enough—if the penalties that are threatened 
are sufficiently draconian—and the costs of litigating high 
enough, defendants might accept quite harsh punishment, even 
when they believe they’ve done nothing wrong and are confronted 
with criminal charges of which they’ve had no fair warning.130 
The drop in the number of actual trials and the corresponding increase in 
the number of plea bargains further erode the protection of prosecutorial 
discretion.131 Prosecutors have traditionally been checked by limited 
resources (like time and money) and by the judicial process (at trial).132 With 
most cases ending in a plea bargain—some estimate the federal settlement 
rate at 97%133—those checks are largely gone. Although frivolous charges are 
unlikely to exert undue pressure, “arguably sustainable charges, even if based 
on weak and contestable grounds, combined with a large number of charges 
with at least a slight prospect of success can suffice to pressure defendants to 
                                                                                                                                      
 126. Ronald A. Cass, Overcriminalization: Administrative Regulations, Prosecutorial 
Discretion, and The Rule of Law, 15 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 11, 23 (2014).  
 127. See, e.g., Misner, supra note 116. 
 128. Cass, supra note 126, at 23–24. 
 129. Misner, supra note 116, at 717. 
 130. Cass, supra note 126, at 24. 
 131. Id. at 3. 
 132. Id. at 24. 
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settle.”134 This phenomenon is compounded by the nature of overlapping 
provisions.135 And the last check—the political process—may not be effective 
either.136 At bottom, “[t]he plain fact is that more than nine-tenths of local 
prosecutors’ decisions are supervised or reviewed by no one.”137 
Another common refrain is that if a prosecutor does not level charges 
against the particular conduct, then “no harm, no foul.” However, this, too, 
is myopic. For one, it ignores the “freedom-limiting, anxiety-producing, and 
guilt-inducing effects the criminal law may have on those who take its 
demands seriously, even apart from the threat of punishment.”138 Absent a 
well-demarcated line of legality, citizens may have to wait to see if their 
conduct is deemed “criminal” by the local or federal prosecutor. The 
alternative is to wait until the applicable statute of limitations runs out—if 
there is such a limitation.139  
Mens rea is also advanced as a defense against various criminal charges, 
and, of course, it does serve that purpose in various contexts. Mens rea—or 
evil intent—was a critical element of common-law offenses.140 However, 
reliance on mens rea may not properly protect defendants or even properly 
isolate criminal conduct.141 For the reasons noted above, questions regarding 
intent may necessarily need to be litigated and challenged, potentially at great 
cost. In sum, if you have to litigate mens rea or intent, you may have already 
lost, and any victory is pyrrhic. This is even assuming the relevant statute has 
a mens rea requirement: “Today, Congress oftentimes creates felony offenses 
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that do not require proof of Blackstone’s ‘vicious will.’ These offenses 
authorize imprisonment and carry the same moral condemnation as 
common law crimes.”142 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has addressed two types of over-criminalization that are often 
not discussed in the literature. First, when legislatures omit (or when courts 
“read out”) materiality requirements in statutes, the scope of criminal 
sanctions is likely expanded beyond what was intended. Second, when 
materiality (or similar) qualifiers are placed in a statute, the interpretation of 
those qualifiers may nullify the protection they were intended to provide. 
Both problems result in a pernicious and subtle form of over-criminalization.   
 
                                                                                                                                      
 142. Meese & Larkin, supra note 35, at 742 (footnotes omitted). 
